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Abstract. In the present essay we attempt to reconstruct Newtonian mech-
anics under the guidance of logical principles and of a constructive approach re-
lated to the genetic epistemology of J. Piaget and R. García (Piaget and García,
1989). Instead of addressing Newton’s equations as a set of axioms, ulti-
mately given by the revelation of a prodigious mind, we search for the fun-
damental knowledge, beliefs and provisional assumptions that can produce
classical mechanics. We start by developing our main tool: the No Arbitrari-
ness Principle, that we present in a form that is apt for a mathematical theory
as classical mechanics. Subsequently, we introduce the presence of the ob-
server, analysing then the relation objective-subjective and seeking objectivity
going across subjectivity. We take special care of establishing the precedence
among all contributions to mechanics, something that can be better appreci-
ated by considering the consequences of removing them: (a) the consequence
of renouncing logic and the laws of understanding is not being able to under-
stand the world, (b) renouncing the early elaborations of primary concepts
such as time and space leads to a dissociation between everyday life and phys-
ics, the latter becoming entirely pragmatic and justified a-posteriori (because
it is convenient), (c) changing our temporary beliefs has no real cost other
than effort. Finally, we exemplify the present approach by reconsidering the
constancy of the velocity of light. It is shown that it is a result of Newtonian
mechanics, rather than being in contradiction with it. We also indicate the
hidden assumption that leads to the (apparent) contradiction.
7th December 2018
Keywords: Newtonian mechanics, no arbitrariness principle, objective vs
subjective description, law of inertia, central forces, energy conservation, laws
of Nature, genetic epistemology
ORCID numbers: H. G. Solari: 0000-0003-4287-1878 M. A. Natiello:
0000-0002-9481-7454
1. Introduction
Probably every physics student has wondered what is behind Newton’s laws.
Some may even have read the Principia Newton (1687) looking for an answer, just
to find a few indications in the introduction followed by a large hiatus taking them
directly to Newton’s axioms, with no clue on how to produce them. While some
everyday experiences can be used to grasp the first and third law, the second law
appears to be arbitrary (to say the least). Are there principles operating behind
the laws? Is there a unity among them? What do they hide? These questions
have bugged all scientists exposed to physics as they have bugged us since we
were students. They are relevant for the constructivist approach known as second
order science (Mueller, 2014; Lissack, 2017) as well. Are the foundations of physics
intuitions of powerful minds subject to no other rule than an a posteriori test of
usefulness? Are they useful pragmatic beliefs subject to no rule of construction (an
idea going back at least to Peirce (Hartshorne and Weiss, 1931; Burks, 1946)) to be
replaced only when a new genius handles us a new set of axioms? Is then reasoning
1
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in physics restricted to the deductive form, to instrumental reason? Or is there
room for critical reason searching for the foundations? Shouldn’t a philosophy of
physics follow Hegel’s dictum: “progress in philosophy is rather a retrogression and
a grounding or establishing by means of which we first obtain the result that what
we began with is not something merely arbitrarily assumed but is in fact the truth,
and also the primary truth.” Hegel (2001, par. 101)?
On the utilitarian side, reasoning is the most powerful adaptation of the animal
we call human being to the conditions of Nature, for reason allows humans to foresee
the outcomes of events and to act taking advantage of opportunities, avoiding
dangers and unfavourable conditions. As a consequence, inasmuch as reasoning
enhances adaptive capabilities, it is a part of natural selection. This selection took
place in front of the difficulties placed by natural phenomena.
On the idealistic side, a long-term desire of mankind is to understand Nature.
What is implied in it? Understanding Nature is a search for harmony, it means
trying to see how all apparent contingencies (good or bad) are in fact aspects
of different expressions of the totality implied in Nature (or can be constructed
as such). Even in the quest for understanding elusive matters as mathematical
chaos, the intellectual exercise is not an apology of what exists beyond all possible
organisation/understanding but rather, to find the perspective that allows us to see
harmony in what, at first sight, was perceived as disorder Solari et al (1996). This
view is related to the concept of praxis, which in phenomenology is considered “a
human activity that is pursued as an end in itself, that is, a terminal goal of human
living rather than as practical problem-solving (techne)” (Heelan, 2003) .
Understanding Nature demands the development of several processes, being the
most immediate one to strip off the particularities that dress observations (in re-
lation to the matter under discussion), thus disclosing properties common to them
and relations that often have been named the essence (Husserl, 1983). This process
is associated to abstraction. We emphasise here that in these terms, essence is not
absolute but instead relative to the posed questions.
For example, for any discussion of the biomechanics of a horse, the colour of its
coat is irrelevant, yet if what we are to discuss is the “market price” of the horse, the
coat usually plays a significant role in a predictive theory. The reader may want
to distinguish the act of abstracting away colour when considering biomechanics
from more demanding idealisations requiring some sort of extrapolation such as
e.g., regarding the dynamics of frictionless bodies as the (unattainable) limit of the
behaviour of bodies subject to different degrees of friction. For this process Galileo
used the word idealisation (see e.g., Discorsi e Dimostrazioni Matematiche Intorno
a Due Nuove Scienze (Galilei, 1914, day 4)). We will use in the sequel the word
idealisation without distinguishing between both types of processes (we notice that
Husserl used the word ideation for the process of intuition transforming the observed
into ideas). In this process of idealisation experience is put in terms of relations
between idealised (abstract) objects through synthetic judgements (Kant). These
relations are tentative and are always to be suspected of being in contradiction with
new observations; we call them theories.
Descartes introduced the expression “laws of Nature” referring to principles of
physics concerning the motion of bodies (Discourse on method (Descartes, 2015, p.
19)). The dogma that Nature follows its own laws, which can then be discovered,
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soon gave birth to a new child: Newton’s laws, presented in his Philosophiæ Nat-
uralis Principia Mathematica, Newton (1687). These developments represent the
beginning of the scientific revolution which includes the mathematisation of the
idealised relations (Galileo) and a reconstruction of the idea of “cause” to be com-
patible with idealised relations. Yet, Aristotle’s dictum “we think we do not have
knowledge of a thing until we have grasped its why, that is to say, its cause” (Phys-
ics, (Aristotle, 1994–2010) ) remained valid. In this sense, the quest of knowledge
maintained a continuity from the ancient greeks to the modern scientists.
The understanding of causative relations is the long-term programme of science.
However, the relation of cause and effect is not free of debate. It was tackled by
Hume (Hume, 1896) as a necessary relation between contiguous objects. For Hume,
causes must always precede effects. As realised later by Russell (Russell, 1912-1913),
cause became a confusing term seldom used by scientists. He indicated that instead
of causes scientists use “state functional relations between certain events at earlier
and later times or at the same time", he uses the name determinants for these
events. Both the determinants and the relations are necessary to answer Aristotle’s
question: why it happens? and as such, they are Aristotelian causes.
In the crusade for the “elimination of metaphysics”, Carnap (Carnap, 1959) as-
serts “we say of a thing or process y that it ’arises out of’ x when we observe that
things or processes of kind x are frequently or invariably followed by things or pro-
cesses of kind y (causal connection in the sense of a lawful succession).” Cause in
Carnap takes the form of a relation between observed things or processes, insisting
in Hume’s old empiricist view. Let us challenge such extreme empiricist notion.
Consider a rectangular cloth suspended by strings tied to its four corners. If we
let a ball rest on the cloth we observe a deformation of the cloth and the forma-
tion of some wrinkles that evidence tensions. Is the ball the cause of the wrinkles
and the deformation? Or perhaps the wrinkles have attracted the ball? Such a
simple matter is not easy to decide using Carnap’s dictum. The deformation and
the presence of the ball resting on the cloth are simultaneous; there is no preced-
ence in time. However, it has never been observed that by making wrinkles on a
cloth we can attract balls in the surroundings. Clearly, we say that the ball is the
cause of the deformation and the wrinkles (this example is adapted from (Kant,
1787, p. 183)). Thus, causes can very well be simultaneous with effects and the
decision about what is the cause of a phenomenon is taken based on reason and
on other experiences. But physics requires more than this type of analysis. Take
the ball, lift it and let it drop. Is there a relation between what makes the ball fall
and the cloth to wrinkle? We all know that there is a relation between not-falling
(staying on the cloth) and wrinkles, and both events point towards an element left
outside in the previous analysis: gravitation. Without gravitation (or with lesser
gravitation) we would observe no (or smaller) deformation, and no (or slower) fall.
Gravitation can be inferred but not observed (the same can be said of tension). In
our observations, gravitation is acting as a necessary element in our explanation,
i.e., a cause in Aristotle’s perception. Thus, if we want to construct knowledge we
have to abandon the crusade against metaphysics and allow ingredients that are
produced by our mind; in this case elements such as gravitation that are not sens-
ible but rather inferred (call them meta-sensible if it pleases the reader). We shall
call them metaphysical (where does physics end?). We notice that by so doing the
time-order between causes and effects is erased to a good extent, for gravitation is
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there before, during and after the time the ball rests on the cloth, although what it
counts for us is that it was before and during the experiment. The fall of the ball
on the cloth (with the subsequent coming to rest) and the wrinkles are the result
of at least one common cause. In the empiricist view, metaphysics is not absent
but rather hidden in habits and commonplaces. We cannot account for experience
without some degree of idealisation, i.e., metaphysics. We observe that putting
metaphysics back into science is suggested as well in Lissack (2017).
Our use of cause will indicate relations of the kind described by Russell un-
less otherwise stated. For example, we will later state that “force is the cause of
acceleration” since force expresses a functional relation between a change in velo-
city, time and other physical characteristics. Notice that in this case there are no
determinants.
Equipped with reasoning, idealisation and an understanding of cause in order
to address natural phenomena, in the present work we will try to distinguish the
diverse elements that contribute to the construction of classical (Newtonian) mech-
anics elaborating from the construction of reality in childhood as described by
genetic epistemology. We find three clear sources for these contributions, namely:
(a) requisites of reason, named principles (b) intuitive building blocks that are con-
stitutive of our understanding after their production in our early contact with the
world (called axioms) and (3) provisional assumptions with respect to the organ-
isation of the sensible world which, as pragmatical beliefs Hartshorne and Weiss
(1931), are the main target of procedures such as falsation (or falsification) Popper
(1959) and retroduction (often called abduction) Hartshorne and Weiss (1931);
Burks (1946).
With the word principle we mean a requisite of reason prior to any theorisation or
empiric tests. Two principles will be stated in the next section, being the Principle
of no Arbitrariness (NAP) the most far-reaching. We note on passing that the
word “principle” has other uses as well (e.g., Newton’s third law is also called the
Principle of Action and Reaction). As for axioms, they are broad building blocks
that constitute the basis of a theory. In theories about Nature, axioms are to a
large extent motivated by the way human beings relate to Nature and may be
questioned if they fail in this respect. Axioms are related to intuitions in Husserl’s
phenomenology (Husserl, 1983), since we proceed first by removing spatio-temporal
determinants and further incorporating the concept (the essence, Eidos). Husserl
states “seeing an essence is precisely intuition”. Within a mathematical theory,
however, the axioms are accepted without need for proof. Assumptions, in turn,
are local decisions in order to limit the scope of the theory according to the desired
goals. Consider for example: “in the sequel we consider forces of instantaneous
action at a distance”. The axioms and previous theory may encompass other types
of forces as well, but our local interest in a given context is delimited by making
this (or other) assumption. Mathematical theories of Nature are usually built up
by axioms and assumptions, where axioms represent our intuition of Nature, our
experience, and are the starting point of empiricist theories. We add here a higher
level to this structure which comes from the subject and it precedes and rules
intuitions. We argue that this principle is a fundamental element in Physics.
This work is the result of an interplay between philosophy, psychology, mathem-
atics and physics, traditions of thoughts that we do not conceive as autonomous
but rather different realisations of the same general form that we call reason, this
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is, reason as it is needed in this or that field of use (application). The reader not
familiar with this synthetic form, and perhaps not comfortable in all of the partic-
ular forms is invited to skip the unfriendly details in a first reading. For example,
proofs are unavoidable for mathematicians but physicists will often adopt a “for the
moment I trust you” attitude in a first reading.
The mathematisation of NAP is in Section 2, the application of NAP to space
and time and a new insight into Galileo’s transformations is to be found in Section
3. Sections 4 and 5 show how NAP enters in Newton’s laws. These two Sections
contain the most demanding mathematics. Section 6 is devoted to reflecting about
Newton’s mechanics with connections to other criticisms and analyses of Newton’s
work. Section 7 treats the speed of light within the Newtonian system. We first
show that what is measured is expected to be independent of the Galilean frame.
Next we uncover a hidden assumption that leads to the well-known problem between
a constant speed of light, Newton’s law and the hidden assumption. Readers mainly
interested in this matter may want to skip Sections 4 and 5 (Section 3 is required).
Within this discussion the last mathematical difficulty appears in Subsubsection
7.1.2 where we adopt, for the sake of the exercise, absolute time and absolute
space showing that even substantivalists Maudlin (1993) have options within the
Newtonian world to account for a constant speed of light. This is an example of
how constructivism offers new forms of thinking physical problems. Finally Section
8 sums up the manuscript.
Natives of psychology and philosophy will have to endure our speaking of those
subjects as foreigners. Further, we do not pretend to be disciplinary experts in all
of the above mentioned fields, rather we use the disciplined thought to corroborate,
support and sharpen our own (free) thinking. The reader is warned that this work
is made of undisciplined thinking more in the “prophetic tradition” than in the
“scholastic” one Nisbet (1971).
2. No arbitrariness principle
In any rational construction attempting to logically articulate the natural world,
we are bound to keep elements not based in reason or evidence outside the con-
struction if possible. Since what is determined by chance, whim, or impulse, and
not by necessity, reason, or principle is called arbitrary1, we adopt the attitude of
rejecting arbitrary practices. If it were not possible to achieve a full exclusion of
arbitrariness, we must make sure that the arbitrariness introduced plays no role in
answering valid questions with respect to Nature. While it is certainly possible to
uproot the questions whose answers depend on arbitrary decisions, in constructing
a theory we must strive to avoid the arbitrariness as much as possible and to keep
the valid questions as broad as possible.
This approach to understanding will be called the No Arbitrariness Principle.
Resigning this principle i.e., admitting arbitrariness as a basic ingredient, would
render communication extremely difficult. The principle delimits the conditions
with which knowledge about Nature is to develop. As such, it is therefore prior to
physics and experience and cannot be questioned empirically. In a theory of natural
phenomena, subsequent axioms –and even more assumptions– are connected to
empiric evidence and may be falsified empirically, thus suggesting the need for a
more adequate theory.
1See for example, The Free Dictionary, https://www.thefreedictionary.com/
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Struggling to avoid arbitrariness in a physical description immediately reflects
in the invariance of this description with respect to elections for which we do not
have a reasonable foundation. For example, measurements imply comparisons and
the units of measurement are arbitrary to a good extent, yet velocity will always
be written in terms of a ratio between distance and time. This form is independent
of arbitrary choices of units, although the figure of the velocity changes according
to the chosen units.
Within the mathematical theory we are about to develop, we will formulate these
ideas as principles :
Principle 1. There is a material world we perceive with our senses (including ex-
periments).
We call this world Nature and we strive to find laws that describe its perceived
organisation. In this context we state the main idea of this work:
Principle 2. [ No Arbitrariness Principle (NAP)] No knowledge of Nature
depends on arbitrary decisions.
In short, NAP establishes that: If there is no reason for it, we shall make no
difference. In this simple form it can be recognised as Leibniz’ principle of sufficient
reason Ballard (1960) put in a cognitive context2.
The arbitrary decisions adopted while constructing a theory can be viewed as
forming a group of transformations operating over the laws and/or the magnitudes
involved in the theory. Each choice of elements in the set of arbitrary assump-
tions is used to produce a presentation of the theory and all presentations must be
equivalent, i.e., conjugated by elements of the group of arbitrary decisions (we will
formalise this idea in mathematical terms in Subsection 2.2).
It is important to notice that this approach evolves from the construction of
reality by the child. We quote Piaget on groups: “There is a mutual dependence
between group and object; the permanence of objects presupposes elaboration of
the group of their displacements and vice-versa. On the other hand, everything
justifies us in centering our description of the genesis of space around that of the
concept of group. Geometrically, ever since H. Poincaré this concept has appeared
as a prime essential to the interpretation of displacements [...] But it is necessary
to remember that we shall attribute the widest meaning to this concept for if,
as recent works have shown, the logical definition of the group is inexhaustible
and involves the most essential processes of thought, it is possible, purely from
2The principle of sufficient reason (PSR) has made little or no progress since the Clarke-Leibniz
polemic Ballard (1960). A discussion among substantivalists and relationalists has re-emerged
with Relativity Theory but in a form in which philosophy is subordinated to the “success” of
physics. Within such an intellectual disposition it has been declared that “neither the PSR nor
the PII enjoys at present unquestionable philosophical credentials” Maudlin (1993) (PII stands
for Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles). Actually, the discussion appears as frozen in time,
lacking critical contributions and it still revolves around God. In contrast, NAP stands for a
critical as well as operative view, it has a long tradition in mathematics where the expression
“without lost of generality we can assume...” is frequent in proofs, meaning that the results will
not depend on our arbitrary choices but for the sake of the argument a choice must be made.
This is: arbitrariness should not and will not bear any consequence in what is being proved.
The metacognitive instruction received by every student of physics: “the final result should not
depend in your election of units or your choice of path to reach it” manifests the same conviction:
arbitrariness has no part in truth.
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our psychological point of view, to consider as a group every system of operations
capable of permitting a return to the point of departure.” Piaget (1999)
2.1. Objectivity and intersubjectivity. If we observe a cat stalking a bird in
our garden, we perceive a distance between cat and bird and we have indications
that both cat and bird perceive something similar, since the cat does not launch
the attack until the distance is short enough and the bird does not fly away until
the cat is threatening close.
In the next Section we will formalise these perceptions in the concept of relative
position, saying that it is objective (as well as cat and bird are), while our per-
ceptions of it are intersubjective, meaning that the cat’s, bird’s and any observer’s
perceptions can be put in one-to-one correspondence. In most of the text we will
make no difference between objective and intersubjective. When we make a dif-
ference it corresponds to the fact that for sensible objects we produce the internal
representation by experience or intuition (eidetic seeing or ideation in Husserl) leav-
ing aside contingent elements, but there are other objects (essence, Eidos) which
are the datum of eidetic intuition (Husserl, 1983). Thus we call ’objective’ repres-
entations produced by ideation and ’intersubjective’ all representations irrespective
of the origin. As such, space is objective but time is only intersubjective. A cor-
responding distinction was made by Kant (Kant, 1787) in his discussion of “the a
priori of knowledge”.
The internal representations need not be the same but just corresponding ones.
Let xCB be a symbol for the idea of relative position between cat and bird. We
are used to think that the observer a represents it as xCB = x
a
C − x
a
B, which is in
fact a synthetic judgement -not a mathematical one- since it proposes a relation
between three different concepts: the positions xaC , x
a
B of cat and bird relative to
the observer (or to a reference of her/his choice) and the relative position between
cat and bird xCB. Since the observer entered the picture by the arbitrary action of
referring positions with respect to her/himself, this expression must be subject to
the no arbitrariness principle, NAP. It is important to realise that xCB is a symbol
that relates to the sensory perceived world, not an internal mathematical object.
The relation between mathematics and objectivity has been addressed from sev-
eral points of view in the past. For example: the objectivity of mathematics (post-
Hilbert), the objectivity of statistical models (Rasch, 1968), or the problem of
meaning and objectivity (Hill and Haddock, 2000). None of the points of view
which we are aware of attempts to formalise objectivity in mathematical terms.
2.2. Mathematisation of objectivity. Consider a set E of concepts/magnitudes
and a set A of arbitrary decisions, necessary for its representation. Let Ra(e) be a
representation of the concept e ∈ E depending on the arbitrary decision a ∈ A and
let F be a “natural law” expressed as F (Ra(e)) = 0. For example, if the concept
e is “distance”, Ra(e) is the real number giving the distance according to a and
the “natural law” is some mathematical expression involving this number, such as
Ra(e)−C = 0 if the natural law expresses that this distance has the constant value
C.
Definition 1. Objectivity: A law is objective if F (Ra(e)) = 0 holds for any
a ∈ A.
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Consider an invertible transformation Tab that maps a representation Ra onto
another representation Rb (Tab ◦ Tba = Id). By NAP, Definition 1 can be restated
as:
(2.1) F (Ra(e)) = 0⇔ F (TbaRa(e)) = F (Rb(e)) = 0.
The transformations Tab form a group
3 T . We assume that:
a) Tab ◦ Tbc = Tac, there exists a composition law.
b) Taa = Id, there exists an identity.
c) Tab = (Tba)
−1or (Tba ◦ Tab) = Id, an inverse exists.
d) Tab ◦ (Tbc ◦ Tcd) = (Tab ◦ Tbc) ◦ Tcd, the composition law is associative.
As a consequence, Tab ◦ (Tbc ◦ Tca) = Id = (Tab ◦ Tbc) ◦ Tca and Tab ◦ (Tbc ◦ Tcd) =
Tab ◦ Tbd = Tad = Tac ◦ Tcd = (Tab ◦ Tbc) ◦ Tcd.
3. Space, Time and Observers
The system of concepts that allows the organisation of reality is dialectical, with
multiple concepts coming into existence at once. Certain concepts in this system
are meaningful only in relation to other concepts introduced simultaneously. In all
dialectical constructions, the tension of the opposites is the engine of understand-
ing, but the terms in opposition present no difference between them other than
being just the terms of the opposition. Hegel’s dialectic of being and not-being is
perhaps the clearest example of this constructive procedure (Hegel, 2001). In our
case, the concepts: ego, alter, identity, object, space and time are the fundamental
building blocks for the construction of understanding; they cannot be referred to
previous concepts because understanding can only be referred to its opposite: not-
understanding. Thus, any attempt at defining these terms will never be completely
satisfactory since we will have to resort to some complicity from the intuitions of
the reader. We call this process dialectical openings to understanding4. In practical
3We notice that in a structural realist work Delhôtel Delhôtel (2017) has considered the re-
stricted case of transformations concerning space-time following the relativistic tradition born out
of Poincaré’s principle. He identifies “a major item on the structural realist agenda: being able to
demonstrate that structural features are precisely and only those that are preserved across theory
change, in one fashion or another, exactly or approximately” and later identifying “equivalence
principles” as one of such structures. What we discuss here is stronger and deeper, because we
account for the reasons why equivalence structures are required in a more general setting than
Poincaré’s Relativity Principle (that will be briefly and critically discussed below). The structure
identified in Delhôtel (2017) is a particular case of the mathematisation of NAP presented here.
The requirement of having a group of transformations connecting descriptions differing in arbi-
trary choices is recognised in Delhôtel (2017, (sec. 3)) not as a requisite of reasoning but only as
a consequence of the postulates of the dynamics.
4In our daily quest to understand nature we make use of ideas and concepts previously produced
by our society that we have naturalised (included in Nature although they belong to our cultural
baggage). However, the recursion to previous understanding has an end and it is not always
possible. When we arrive to such a dead end while exercising the critical reason in the search for
the fundamentals we have exhausted the possibilities of analysis, the limits of Analytical science
Hegel (2001, (par. 1720-1764)). Hegel states “Synthetic cognition aims at the comprehension of
what is, that is, at grasping the multiplicity of determinations in their unity. It is therefore the
second premise of the syllogism in which the diverse as such is related” . “Synthetic cognition” is
presented by Hegel in contradistinction to “Analytic cognition”. Kant Kant (1787) considered time
an a-priori of knowledge, and it is certainly an a-priori for the adult as well as space is. Piaget
taught us that the genesis of the notions of space and time is found in the early childhood Piaget
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terms, when we mention a concept (in this section) using a word that is defined
later in the text, it should be understood in its intuitive form, later to be formalised
in a compatible form. We can identify the dialectical pairs ego-alter and change-
permanence (time-identity). As for space, considering that it implies the concept
of distance and with it the idea of what is within reach and what belongs to our
world but cannot be reached without effort, it is the result of the dialectic near me
(reachable) and at a distance (not reachable, i.e., not near me). Notice that the
notion of oppositions as first principles is a subject already considered in Aristotle’s
Physics (Aristotle, 1994–2010), also referring to previous philosophers.
Notation 1. In this Section we will try as much as possible to use superindices a, b
to indicate subjective (i.e., depending on arbitrary decisions) concepts, quantities,
etc., while related objective entities will have no superindex.
3.1. Space and time.
3.1.1. Space. Space is spontaneously conceived by children along the construction
of reality (Piaget, 1999). It is not possible to speak separately of object, space, time
and ego, because the construction produces all of them as a single dialectic system
(we could try to straighten this matter up philosophically, although this would
not be loyal to the child’s structuring of thought). By exercising our memory we
perceive some degree of permanence of ourselves, ego, and thus an idea of identity.
The real world acquires continuity, we do not longer watch the movie frame by
frame. Together with the recognition of ourselves comes alter, i.e., not-ego, and
with the help of our memory some sort of permanency of alter emerges as well, the
object that later, stripped of all other characteristics will be the “body” referenced
in physics. Therefore, objects, people and other things acquire some sort of identity,
inasmuch as we remove some attributes of them, mainly positions in space. Then,
if an object (or ourselves) is in a place in one movie-frame and in a different place
in another movie-frame, we no longer say they are different objects but rather that
there was a change in the positions as well as some permanence: the object itself.
The sequence of changes in places is the primary idea of time. Much later the child
will conceive herself as being of the same condition than family, pets and toys, this
is, she will place herself in the space. Space, with its implication of distance (a
concept that is easy to root in sensorymotive intelligence) is opposed to the unity
of the cosmos of the child.
The perceived space-time, centered in the observer (ego) always has ego distin-
guishing a reference point. This primary, subjective, notion of space is compatible
with an empty space, a holder of objects, an idea that in physics goes back, at
least, to Newton. Emptiness is in fact a resource for the subsequent suppression of
the observer. By NAP, the required objectivity of the laws of physics manifests in
that no law is objective if it depends on ego. The mathematisation of this idea is
expressed by eq.(2.1), where the group T corresponds to spatial translations and
rotations.
Axiom 1. A set of three orthogonal directions in the real (sensible) space is selected
and represented by the symbols ei. Any objective position is then represented by
xAB =
∑
i xiei with xi real numbers.
(1999). Accounting for this philosophical tradition, we call dialectical openings to knowledge the
dialectical constructions that set up the basic elements for the knowledge of Nature, such as time,
space and object. In such a way, we emphasize their synthetic origin.
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Objective space is hence built following Descartes and is represented as a vector
space. Any other choice of reference vectors can be related to the initial one by a
linear transformation, e′j =
∑
iRjiei. It follows that
∑
j x
′
je
′
j =
∑
i xiei for any
objective position, hence x′j =
∑
i
[
R−1
]
ij
xi. The observer can then select a ref-
erence point and three independent orientations to describe the position of objects
in the world, yet leaving the distance as objective. The class of equivalence thus
generated is described by the group IO(3), the group of isometries (translations,
rotations and reflections).
Subjective space, being empty, provides no way of distinguishing one direction
from another or one reference point from another. As a consequence of NAP,
subjective space is then isotropic and homogeneous. We notice that objective space
bears some relation to Leibniz’ relational space, while subjective space is related to
Newton’s relative space Ballard (1960).
We recall that Axioms correspond to intuitions based upon experience, the
Cartesian space agrees with the experience of the child and of the scientist in
Newton times. Furthermore, the analytical properties of e.g., Riemannian spaces
are based upon differentiable manifolds which in turn rest upon collections of local
charts of Cartesian type, a fact that speaks loudly about which one is the intuitive
space.
3.1.2. Time. Unlike space, time is undoubtedly related to changes, sequences of
changes, rapidity and causal relations Piaget (1999). This is the genetic episteme
of time; to call “time” any other kind of object is simply to ask for confusion5.
5Piaget arrived to his view about the genesis of the concept of time after a series of experiments.
The experiments are conveniently collected in (Piaget, 1978).
The notion of speed, at least in the form of faster and slower, precedes the notion of time: “From
the point of view of immediate experience, the child succeeds very soon in estimating speeds of
which he has direct awareness, the spaces traversed in an identical time or the “before” and “after”
in arrival at a goal in cases of trajectories of the same length. But there is a considerable gap
between this and a dissociation of the notion of speed to extract a measurement of time, for this
would involve replacing the direct intuitions peculiar to the elementary accommodation of thought
to things by a system of relations involving a constructive assimilation.” Piaget (1999, p. 383).
Aristotle relates changes in position, velocity and time. In modern notation we could write
(for finite v > 0)
t− tA =
∫
x
xA
v · dx
|v|2
=
∫
x
xA
|dx|
|v|
.
We can move back to the perception of the child by making v constant. Thus, change in position
offers a clock, and since space is assumed to be continuous, so is time (an old reasoning already
present in Aristotle). As long as the moon revolves around the Earth, we have change and we
have time. No interval of time will ever be empty of changes.
Other points of view regarding time have been put forward and continue to exist. For example,
time has been conceived geometrically as well, taking such character in Special Relativity. Under
the geometrical conception McTaggart has even argued that time is unreal (McTaggart, 1908).
The incompatibility of the perceived time with the time of Relativity resulting from Gödel work
(Gödel, 1949) was discussed and asserted by Bell (Bell, 2002). Here, a distinction has to be made.
On one hand Piaget’s view seeks the genesis of time (and the way we consider time in our daily
facts) in the phenomena and its apprehension as idea. On the other hand, there are instrumental
beliefs whose roots are nurtured by the mud of speculative material entities such as the æther and
the electrical fluid veiled to us by mathematical axioms. The different ideas revolving around the
notion of time might originate in overlooked assumptions of the idealisation method: when we
proceed through successive idealisations, the order among them matters. Dynamical instabilities
and irreversibility (entropy) are the result of first considering the limit of sufficiently long times
and subsequently (if needed) the limit of infinite measurement precision (Arnold and Avez, 1968).
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Time is the word we use to express our perception of change; it is change in its
most abstract form. Aristotle indicates “without change there is no time” Aristotle
(1994–2010, Book IV, Ch. 11).
The perception of change we use to construct our intuition of time rests on nat-
ural processes. An invariant characteristic of our perception of Nature is that ex-
perienced processes have beginning and end. Husserl Husserl (1983, Matter of fact)
states “The founding cognitional act of experiencing posit something real individu-
ally; they posit it as something factually existing spatio-temporally, as something
that is at this temporal locus, that has this duration of its own and a reality con-
tent which, with respect to its essence, could just as well have been at any other
temporal locus.”
Time is a verbalisation of the dialectical tension of the pair being/not-being. In
principle, time is associated to objects (or measured) by the order of the sequence of
changes (between sundown and sunrise the rooster sings, and if the rooster wakes
me up every morning, it sings before -or rather while- I wake up, because this
song is (part of) the cause of my awakening). Piaget (1999, Ch. 4) discusses the
development of the notion of time in the child beginning from “As early as his reflex
activity and the formation of his first habits, the nursling shows himself capable of
two operations which concern the elaboration of the temporal series. In the first
place, he knows how to coordinate his movements in time and to perform certain
acts before others in regular order. For instance, he knows how to open his mouth
and seek contact before sucking, how to steer his hand to his mouth and even his
mouth to his thumb before putting the thumb between his lips, etc.” The child
proceeds (always according to Piaget) in five stages to develop his notion of time,
always based on series. Starting at the third stage memory plays an increasingly
relevant role.
One striking difference between time and space from the psychogenetic point
of view is that while for the change of position in space of an object there is a
possible operation that reverts the change, there is no operation capable to revert
the temporal order of events. Unlike distance, that reaches us as a perception
resulting from the telemetry of our binocular sight, time does not reach us as a
perception, but it is rather the result of memory, a log of changes and a logical
process that discriminates between the relative order of events. It follows that
time is measured by comparing sequences of changes. By NAP, any transformation
relating time-perceptions of different references (egos) is constrained to preserve this
ordering. Therefore, while arbitrary individual subjective time may differ among
observers, they are all related by strictly monotonic (bijective) mappings. The
underlying group is the set of strictly increasing continuous functions f : R 7→ R
with standard composition of functions as the group product.
Axiom 2. The order between the events (the various determinants and effects)
involved in a causative relation is fixed.
Deterministic, time-reversible dynamics rests on taking these limits in reverse order. The school
of Brussels showed that, for some systems, irreversibility and time-reversal possibilities respond
to different choices of representation (Goldstein et al, 1981) connected by transformation groups.
The truth is that we have access to finite precision and finite time lapses, while the rest is only
part of the processes of ideation. The arbitrariness that NAP tries to remove may take subtle and
unexpected shapes.
A CONSTRUCTIVIST VIEW OF NEWTON’S MECHANICS 12
This axiom relates to the concept of “determinism” discussed around Equation
(A) in (Russell, 1912-1913, p. 199). In simpler words, first the vase falls, then it
breaks. It is a vase as long as there exists a particular cohesion in the material. The
alteration produced by the impact reorders the material in smaller pieces. Hence,
without fall there is no impact, without impact no change in material stress. Causes
here are gravitation and the change in material stress. Determinants are fall and
impact, while breakup (rupture) is an effect.
When we measure the times of a phenomenon, say the change in position of a
body, we use changes not involved in the process as references for time. Indeed, we
resort to the idealised and imagined order of all events of the universe, encompassing
all possible changes, leaving no “room” between them since a time without changes is
a contradiction in the terms6. In mathematical terms, time is well represented by a
one dimensional mathematical space such as the real numbers, a notion that we have
been using and will continue to use, along this work. Time-intervals are referred
to this “background” of events that are present irrespective of the phenomenon in
study. This background of changes constitutes a clock. We try to use as clocks those
devices or observations that appear to us as regular. As long as we cannot present
evidence that a process runs faster in one circumstance or another, we expect the
relative order between changes in the clock and changes in the phenomena to remain
the same, hence
Assumption 1. An objective time can be defined by convening on a process to
define a time-unit.
Absolute time, a time encompassing all changes, appears to us in the same
manner in which ego, alter, object and space emerge in the development of the child
to produce a useful organisation of the world. The laws of physics and absolute
time emerge in the construction of physics at the same step as a consequence of
the same class of dialectic opening that creates the terms of an opposition that
produces understanding. In this case, system-environment (not system) implies
absolute time.
Definition 2. Events. An event is a change in the sensible world that occurs in
a relatively short interval of time and as such is idealised as instantaneous. We
remove from the event the determinations of time and space, which are thought of
as its circumstances. Thus, events occur at a given location and a given time.
3.2. Observers. The observer (ego) describes the world by measuring all distances
with respect to a point of her/his election. We use the notation xaA for the position
of body A as measured by observer a. When facing the need of relating positions
of different observed bodies, conforming to NAP and the search for an objective
description of physical entities, we define:
6If time is conceived as holding a series of events, we may ask whether it is possible to have
a time interval without changes or events (since each event represents a change). During a time
without changes there would be no heart-beats of the observer, no movement of any object in the
universe, no change that could be used as clock, etc. Between the two encompassing events of
time without change there would be no way to measure time since measuring it requires something
that changes. We would have then proposed that measurable (sensible) time differs from “true
time” by an unaccountable amount, yet all observers will measure zero time identically since it
is a property of monotonic functions to map open intervals into open intervals. Hence, a time
interval without changes contradicts the early determination of time as associated to movement
(change of position in space) and being therefore continuous.
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Definition 3. (relative position): We call xAB = x
a
A − x
a
B the relative position
between observed bodies A and B, as seen from the ego a at a given moment.
Corollary 1. It is a demand of objectivity (by NAP) that xaA − x
a
B = x
b
A − x
b
B
(hence, there is no superindex in xAB).
In a sense related to Leibniz, objective space is relational. Indeed, one may
suspect that vector spaces have been constructed to this end. The group relating
the arbitrary choices of different observers is IO(3), the semi-direct product of
isometries and translations.
In the sequel, we will call subjective the space created by an arbitrary choice of
reference point and base vectors orientations.
Definition 4. Relative velocity is the rate of change of relative position between
two bodies with respect to the change in time,
vAB =
d(xaA − x
a
B)
dt
= lim
∆t→0
(xaA(t+∆t)− x
a
B(t+∆t))− (x
a
A(t)− x
a
B(t))
∆t
.
3.3. Subjective velocity and Galileo transformations. The relative velocity
between the reference point chosen by the observer a and a body A, follows Defin-
ition 4,
vAa =
d(xaA − x
a
a)
dt
= lim
∆t→0
(xaA(t+∆t)− x
a
a(t+∆t))− (x
a
A(t)− x
a
a(t))
∆t
.
We now focus on the subjective operation consisting in setting xaa(t+∆t)−x
a
a(t) =
0a and similarly vaa = lim∆t→0
xa
a
(t+∆t)−xa
a
(t)
∆t = 0
a, this is to say that for the
observer, the point designated as reference by her/his arbitrary decision does not
move (we have added the superscript a to the zero to indicate the subjectivity).
Now the relative velocity reads
vAa =
d(xaA − x
a
a)
dt
= lim
∆t→0
xaA(t+∆t)− x
a
A(t)
∆t
− 0a ≡ vaA − 0
a,
where we call vaA the subjective velocity of A as established by observer a.
Proposition 1. The Galilean transformation between observers (reference points)
a and b is given by,
vaA = v
b
A + vba.
It is an operation that belongs to the group associated by NAP to the concept of
subjective velocity.
Proof. We begin by writing the equality
xaA(t+ dt)− x
a
A(t)− (x
a
a(t+ dt)− x
a
a(t)) = x
b
A(t+ dt)− x
b
A(t)−
(
xba(t+ dt)− x
b
a(t)
)
,
which after a rearrangement reads
(xaA(t+ dt)− x
a
A(t))− 0
a = (xbA(t+ dt)− x
b
A(t)) − 0
b + 0b −
(
xba(t+ dt)− x
b
a(t)
)
.
Next we observe that
0b−(xba(t+dt)−x
b
a(t)) = (x
b
b(t+dt)−x
b
a(t+dt))−(x
b
b(t)−x
b
a(t)) = xba(t+dt)−xba(t),
with xbaan objective relative distance. We then have
(xaA(t+ dt)− x
a
A(t))− 0
a = (xbA(t+ dt)− x
b
A(t)) + (xab(t+ dt)− xab(t))− 0
b.
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Dropping the zeroes, dividing by dt and taking the limit dt → 0, we obtain the
Galilean transformation between observers. We further notice that the limit is not
a necessary step. 
Lemma 1. Galilean transformations form a group having vector addition as in-
ternal operation.
Proof. Repeated use of Proposition 1 gives,
vaA = v
b
A + vba
= (vcA + vcb) + vba
= vcA + (vcb + vba) = v
c
A + vca.

4. The law of inertia
4.1. Laws of Nature. The meaning of laws of Nature deserves some examination.
In western culture before the Enlightenment, it remitted us to God’s blueprints for
the universe as in the early times of Descartes, Newton and Leibniz. After the
Enlightenment, the laws of Nature must rest on reason Kant (1783, 1798). The
question ‘What is a law of Nature?’ has been extensively debated in contempor-
ary philosophy of science. Here we will not focus on what makes a statement to
be a natural law. Nevertheless, no matter how that question is answered, certain
general features of laws can be recognised. The laws of Nature correspond to fun-
damental relations in situations in which a small (minimal) portion of the universe,
the system, is considered (through a process of idealisation) as isolated from its
environment, i.e., the complement in the Universe of the ideally-isolated system.
Such a notion implies that the internal organisation of the system -which the law
will make explicit-, must be independent of the environment since this is the nature
of the concept we are seeking. Hence, the law must hold with independence of
the relative location of the system with respect to the environment and shall not
be affected by the background of changes. In our perspective, there are no laws
of Nature but rather laws for the understanding of Nature, which themselves are
subject to the laws of reasoning and include in their ontogeny both experience and
usefulness: the object and the subject.
4.2. The law of inertia.
Definition 5. An isolated body is an idealisation consisting in extrapolating the
(short-time) motion of bodies that are perceived to be not interacting with other
bodies.
This perception could originate in the fact that when the distance between bodies
is sufficiently large or the time of the observation is sufficiently short, interactions
do not show any appreciable effect (i.e., it is an idealisation).
An isolated body can be regarded as being alone in the universe. As such, it
defines by itself a privileged place and reference point. However, when we deal with
several ideally isolated bodies, we must consider the problem of their changing
(relative) distances (which is a result of the same idealising process). By NAP, the
description given from the perspective of an isolated body must be equivalent to
the description given by any other isolated body inasmuch as the particularity of
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the description is only that the observer is isolated (i.e., not influenced in its motion
by other bodies). The condition of a body as isolated is a condition of permanence,
hence, when compared with time (the measure of change) it has to be represented
by a zero derivative of its state. Therefore, we define,
Definition 6. Inertial set is the collection of isolated bodies. The inertial class of
observers consists of those observers that use an element of the inertial set as point
of reference.
When seeking a fundamental law for isolated bodies we must consider first the
possibility of giving them fixed relative positions, but such a law contradicts our
current perceptions (we recall that in the Aristotelian physics the motion of bodies
required causes, i.e., “forces”).
Assumption 2. There exist at least two isolated bodies that are not at rest relative
to each other.
The next possibility to be considered is:
Lemma 2. Isolated bodies move with constant relative velocity.
Proof. Consider the law of motion of an isolated body, A, as described by an
observer a in the inertial class. By Assumption 2 the law of motion cannot be
d
dt
xAa = 0. The most general law of second order is
d2
dt2
xAa = α(xAa, vAa, t).
However, the law must be the same for all times since there is no privileged time,
α(xAa, vAa, t) = α(xAa, vAa, 0). Additionally, by NAP, a second observer that has
selected its reference position at a fixed distance from a must produce the same
law. It follows that the law cannot depend on xAa and by the same reasoning an
observer that moves with constant relative speed with respect to a must observe
the same law, hence α(xAa, vAa, t) = Υ, being Υ a constant vector. However, such
constant would indicate a particular direction in space unless Υ = 0. Hence, we
arrive to the expression
(4.1)
d2
dt2
xAa = 0,
that satisfies the established requisite of permanency. 
Corollary 2. An inertial observer (i.e., an element of the inertial class) is one in
which only interactions are associated to changes in the velocities.
Proof. The result is just Lemma 2 in negative form. 
Theorem 1. Galilean transformations belong to the group of transformations map-
ping the position determinations of one inertial observer to those of another one.
Proof. By Corollary 2 and Lemma 2 two inertial observers behave as two isolated
bodies with constant (objective) relative velocity. The subjective velocities determ-
ined by each system are related via Proposition 1. 
It is important to notice that Lemma 2 has an equivalent statement in terms of
subjective space and time. The proof is based on the homogeneous and isotropic
character of the subjective space.
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Notice that the inertial observer is a resource of the subjective point of view,
since the objective presentation focuses only in relations. In terms of the objective
presentation if two bodies present a relative velocity that changes with time, then
both of them cannot belong in the inertial class, i.e., at least one of them must
be in interaction with something else. It cannot be ruled out that both of them
interact and none is in the inertial class. Hence we have,
Corollary 3. The relative acceleration αBA, of the body B with respect to an isol-
ated body, A, depends only on the relative positions and velocities of the interacting
material bodies. αBA ≡ αBA(xBC , vBC ; interaction attributes), where C is some
other body in interaction with B.
5. Interacting Bodies
We have shown that the only law of motion compatible with isolated bodies is
the law of inertia. It is time to consider bodies with interactions. The same law
in its negative form is: accelerations (i.e., changes in the instantaneous velocity)
are the result of interactions between bodies. The simplest form of interaction
to be considered involves just two material bodies. Consider an observer in the
inertial class (hence, it does not interact with the bodies under consideration).
From its perspective, if bodies A and B do not follow the inertial law, they must
be interacting, hence the minimal setup for non-inertial motion requires two bodies
that are described by the inertial (isolated) observer, which establishes the following
relations:
d
dt
vaA = α
a
A
d
dt
vaB = α
a
B(5.1)
d
dt
(vaA − v
a
B) =
d
dt
vAB = αAB,
where αAB is the (objective) relative acceleration of body A with respect to body
B.
Assumption 3. Accelerations are additive i.e., for any inertial observer a, the
acceleration produced onto a material body (A) jointly by bodies (B) and (C), given
that B and C do not influence each other, satisfies αaA(B,C) = α
a
A(B) + α
a
A(C),
i.e., it is the sum of the accelerations produced by individual interactions of A with
(B) and with (C).
Following Newton,
Assumption 4. We consider in the sequel interactions of instantaneous action at
a distance.
Other types of interactions may be imagined, but we are focusing on Newton’s
programme. This assumption was suggested by observation. For gravitation, it has
so far resisted refutation. Indeed, several experimental measurements indicate that
in classical terms the “speed of gravity” must be larger than 108C (being C the
speed of light), the first argument going back to Laplace (Van Flandern, 1998).
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5.1. Gravitation and mass. The fundamental interaction between two bodies,
the one that is always present and cannot be compensated, is called gravitation of
matter. A fundamental ingredient at this point is Galileo’s proof that all bodies
experience the same acceleration in vertical motion Galilei (1914, Third day, p.
173–). This achievement rests both on the logical need of investigating accelerated
bodies after inquiring about non-accelerated bodies (eq. 4.1) and on experimental
observation.
Assumption 5. The gravitational acceleration αaA(B) produced onto a material
body (A) by a given one (B) is proportional to a characteristic of the body B named
the mass (all other circumstances being identical). The mass of body B is an
objective property (i.e., the same, up to choice of units, for any inertial observer).
In mathematical terms, the accelerations are, letting gaA(B) summarise the rest
of the dependencies,
αaA(B) = mBg
a
A(B)
αaB(A) = mAg
a
B(A).
Corollary 4. The mass of an aggregation of matter is the aggregated mass of the
parts.
Notation 2. From here on, we will drop the index of ego, since we are dealing with
just one observer belonging to the inertial class. For example, we write αA ≡ α
a
A.
However, quantities with two “body”-subindices, such as fAB are always objective.
7
Assumption 6. The gravitational interaction depends only on relative position.
With this we mean that letting xAB = xA−xB, then gA(B) = xABφ, where φ is a
scalar function that may depend on the length of the vector xAB . When considering
the gravitational interaction of two bodies, A, localised in xA and, B, localised in
xB according to an inertial observer, we notice that exchanging attributes between
bodies is the same as exchanging positions, hence an immediate corollary of this
assumption is that gA(B) = −gB(A). As a consequence, to render this symmetry
explicit rather than acceleration it is convenient to consider
Definition 7. FAB = mAαA(B) = mAmBgA(B) is called gravitational force.
A related quantity is
Definition 8. The linear momentum of a material body is the product of its mass
times its velocity p = mv.
Thus, the gravitational interaction is described by the symmetric form
7Binkoski (Binkoski, 2016) argues that with three relational hypotheses it is possible to dis-
tinguish inertial systems from non inertial, while "Galilean relational space-time is too weak of a
structure to support a relational interpretation of classical mechanics." At this point of our for-
mulation it is clear that Newtonian mechanics considers an (external) observer, something what
is necessarily non-relational. In more general terms, the dialectic objective-subjective (attaining
objectivity by negating, going across, subjectivity) that we have presented solves the apparent
opposition between Newton and Leibniz. This solution is reached by means of a critical reflection,
not by adding ad-hoc postulates aiming to obtain some desired relation (what would amount to
resort to instrumental reason).
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d
dt
pA = mA
d
dt
vA = mAαA(B) ≡ FAB = mAmBgA(B)
d
dt
pB = mB
d
dt
vB = mBαB(A) ≡ FBA = mBmAgB(A),
the latter being a definition of the concept of gravitational force and of force, the
cause for the changes in momentum.
Corollary 5. The total momentum pA + pB is constant in time when the bodies
interact gravitationally, i.e.,
d
dt
(pA + pB) =
d
dt
pA +
d
dt
pB = mAmBgA(B) +mBmAgB(A) = 0.
The previous corollary is an immediate consequence of Assumption 6, i.e., of
gA(B) = −gB(A). In Classical Mechanics it is called Newton’s third law and also
Principle of Action and Reaction.
5.2. Other interactions. Let us now consider other interactions following the
previous Newtonian scheme. Assumptions 5 and 6 are too narrow to encompass
other types of interactions, despite its adequacy for gravitation. We rephrase them
in a more general setting as
Assumption. [5′] The defining property Qi is additive for f , i.e.,
f(Q1+Q2, xA, . . . , QB , xB, . . . ) = f(Q1, xA, . . . , QB, xB, . . . )+f(Q2, xA, . . . , QB, xB , . . . ).
Here Qi denotes the defining property of body i associated to the interaction,
i.e., the necessary information in order to determine the interaction, and f is the
associated force, i.e., a quantity representing the departure of bodies A and B from
inertial motion. For example, Q stands for electric charge and f for the Coulomb
electrostatic force (see the final paragraph of Subsection 5.4 for further discussion).
Assumption. [6′] We consider in the sequel interactions that depend only on rel-
ative position and relative velocity.
Newtonian mechanics is based on the generalisation of Definition 7 to other types
of interactions, namely
Assumption 7. Force f is the cause of acceleration. The latter is proportional to
the ratio between force and mass.
We have already realised that a consequence of Lemma 2 is that the presence of
accelerations is an indication (or a symptom) of the existence of interactions. This
assumption states that the totality of the intervening interactions is exhausted in
the acceleration, they are its cause. We should notice that this assumption must
be contrasted with experiments8. Hence, we write,
mA
d2
dt2
xA = f(QA, xA, . . . , QB, xB , . . . )(5.2)
mB
d2
dt2
xB = k(QA, xA, . . . , QB, xB , . . . ).(5.3)
8For example, Weber’s formalisation of Faraday’s induction law Weber (1846) requires for the
induction (electromotive) force to depend on the acceleration (as Faraday’s law also does). This
may be interpreted as having a mass that depends on the relative state of motion of the interacting
charges.
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In this presentation there is no need to introduce inertial mass as something differ-
ent from gravitatory mass. Gravitation is taken to be a fundamental (unavoidable)
interaction and its associated mass is what enters in eqs (5.2 and 5.3). This is a
consequence of the symmetry of the presentation, by which whatever pertains the
gravitational interaction is explicitly displayed.
5.2.1. Consequences. The above symmetry considerations may be propounded for
eqs. (5.2 and 5.3). In fact, f(QA, xA, . . . , QB, xB , . . . ) is the force that the body
with property QB and geometrical parameters xB , · · · exerts on the body with
property QA (and xA, · · · ). The dots indicate that forces may depend on other
geometrical properties than just position (velocity, for example). The quantity
k(QA, xA, . . . , QB, xB , . . . ) is the corresponding force that A exerts on B. It follows
by NAP that
(5.4) k(QA, xA, . . . , QB, xB, . . . ) = f(QB, xB, . . . , QA, xA, . . . ).
Lemma 3. Under the previous assumptions, for a pair of bodies A and B in in-
teraction, the forces f (force on A caused by B) and k (force on B caused by A)
satisfy the Generalised Principle of Action and Reaction, namely
f = xABφe + vABφs + (xAB × vAB)φ⊥
k = −xABφe − vABφs + (xAB × vAB)φ⊥,
where φe, φs, φ⊥ are scalar functions of relative position, relative velocity and pos-
sibly other parameters, xAB = xA − xB and vAB = vA − vB.
Proof. By Assumption 6′ there is no other geometric dependency and we can replace
the occurrences of xA, xB by xAB and those of vA, vB by vAB. Let T denote the
operation of exchanging the geometrical properties associated to bodies A and B
(or, what is the same, switching their defining properties Qi). We have, by NAP,
Tf(Q1, Q2, xAB , vAB, · · · , t) = f(Q2, Q1, xAB, vAB, · · · , t)
= k(Q1, Q2,−xAB,−vAB, · · · , t)(5.5)
Tk(Q1, Q2,−xAB,−vAB, · · · , t) = k(Q2, Q1,−xAB,−vAB, · · · , t)
= f(Q1, Q2, xAB, vAB, · · · , t)
and consequently T 2 = Id. The most general expression for a force between two
interacting bodies depending as vector only on the vectors xAB and vAB is
f(Q1, Q2, xAB, vAB , t) = xABφe + vABφs + (xAB × vAB)φ⊥
k(Q1, Q2, xAB, vAB , t) = xABψe + vABψs + (xAB × vAB)ψ⊥,
where the multiplicative factors φe, φs, φ⊥, ψe, ψs, ψ⊥ are scalar functions of relative
position, relative velocity and possibly other parameters. The reason is that relative
position and relative velocity define only three vectors in space. In other words,
φe, etc., may depend on various properties (charge, velocity, etc.) but are scalar
coefficients. The vector property of f and k is given by linear combinations of xAB,
vAB and xAB×vAB . We recall that the vector w×z (called cross product or vector
product of w and z) has a direction that is perpendicular to both w and z and
whenever w and z are collinear, w × z = 0.
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Exchanging the properties Q1 and Q2 of A and B is equivalent to keeping the
properties and exchanging their masses, positions and velocities. Again by NAP,
from eqs.(5.4 and 5.5) we have,
f(Q1, Q2, xAB , vAB, t) = xABφe + vABφs + (xAB × vAB)φ⊥
= −xABψe − vABψs + ((−xAB)× (−vAB))ψ⊥(5.6)
= −xABψe − vABψs + (xAB × vAB)ψ⊥,
which produces
(5.7) φe = −ψe, φs = −ψs, φ⊥ = ψ⊥.

Remark 1. Gravitation, as conceived by Newton, has vanishing φs and φ⊥.
Lemma 4. Under the Generalized Principle of Action and Reaction the total mo-
mentum, pA + pB, is constant in time if and only if φ⊥ = 0.
Proof. We just compute
d
dt
(pA + pB) = f + k
= xAB(φe − φe) + vAB(φs − φs)
+ (xAB × vAB) (φ⊥ + φ⊥)
= 2 (xAB × vAB)φ⊥.
Moreover, if (x−y) is parallel to (u−v) (unidimensional relative motion) the actual
value of φ⊥ is irrelevant and we can choose to set φ⊥ = 0 also in that situation. 
We must notice that the total momentum as perceived by the observer is a
conserved quantity if and only if φ⊥ = 0 for all forces in classical mechanics. The
idea of conservation of total momentum is a consequence of Newtonian tradition
and not a demand of reason. It must be established in every new theory of Nature
as an additional assumption subject to empirical consideration.
Lemma 5. Under the Generalized Principle of Action and Reaction there is no
internal torque if and only if φs = φ⊥ = 0.
Proof. Following Corollary 4, we compute, recalling that d
dt
vAB = αAB =
f
mA
− k
mB
,
xAB ×
mAmB
mA +mB
d
dt
vAB = xAB ×
mAmB
mA +mB
(
f
mA
−
k
mB
)
= xAB × (xABφe + vABφs)
+
(
mB −mA
mA +mB
)
xAB × (xAB × vAB)φ⊥.
The dependence on φe vanishes by the properties of the cross product. Since the
remaining terms in the rhs have contributions in different directions,
d
dt
[
xAB ×
mAmB
mA +mB
vAB
]
= 0⇔ φs = φ⊥ = 0.
In Classical Mechanics the quantity in square brackets is called angular momentum
and its time-derivative is called torque. 
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5.3. Central Forces. An important issue in Classical Mechanics following the
Newtonian tradition is that of central forces depending only on the relative distance.
From the previous results, the following particular case can be highlighted:
Lemma 6. Under the previous assumptions, if φs = 0 and φe = h(|xAB |) (a scalar
function of relative distance only) then there exists a dynamical quantity (called
internal energy) that is constant in time.
Proof. A standard computation using the relative (objective) quantities defined
previously yields,
(vAB) ·
d
dt
(vAB) ≡
1
2
d
dt
(vAB)
2
= (vAB) ·
(
f
mA
−
k
mB
)
,
which by eqs. (5.6 and 5.7) reads (since vAB · (xAB × vAB) = 0),
1
2
d
dt
(vAB)
2
=
(
1
mA
+
1
mB
)
vAB · (xABφe + vABφs) .
In other words, under the conditions of this Lemma, we have,
1
2
mAmB
mA +mB
d
dt
(vAB)
2
= h(|xAB |)xAB · vAB.
We identify in the lhs the kinetic energy for the relative motion. Let −V (|xAB|) be
such that −∇V = h(|xAB |)xAB. Then, −
dV
dt
= h(|xAB |)xAB · vAB and therefore
d
dt
(
1
2
mAmB
mA +mB
(vAB)
2
+ V (|xAB |)
)
= 0.
The quantity E = 12
mAmB
mA+mB
(vAB)
2
+ V (|xAB |) is known in Classical Mechanics as
internal energy. 
5.4. The tension between inertial and non-inertial. One of the pillars of our
understanding of Nature is observation, which invariably takes place on Earth (or
since recently on its neighbouring galactic surroundings). Both the surface of the
Earth and the Solar System are regarded as non-inertial references by Classical
Mechanics. Indeed, we have no reasons to doubt of this non-inertiality since we
detect its effects. However, since the Leibniz-Clarke discussion and lately Mach
(see below) it has been an important issue the fact we have no means to decide
whether a reference system is inertial (fully free from interactions) or not.
Despite this issue, physics has succeeded in conceiving different fundamental
interactions, such as gravitation or the electrostatic interaction as described by
Coulomb. One may wonder how this could be done in the first place, without
having a clue about “how inertial” we are. The solution presented here finds its
support on three concepts: (a) the process of idealisation described by Galileo,
by which one identifies and eliminates from observation what is conceived to be
foreign to the interaction under study, e.g., the effect of friction forces, or the
presence of other interactions influencing both the system and the observer, (b) a
fully-objective approach where the description of an interaction is performed using
objective (invariant) quantities belonging to the interaction pair (relative positions,
charges and the like) and (c) the honest effort to keep the description free from
influences coming from the observer to the largest possible extent (this descrip-
tion is always provisional until a new, so-far neglected, influence of the observer is
detected). We return to this issue in Subsection 6.1.
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It is illustrative to consider the way in which the founders of electromagnetism
studied the new interactions, an approach based on Assumption 3. Prior to experi-
menting with the new interaction, they let the system to be at rest in the observer’s
frame as a result of the equilibrium of the (other) present forces and accelerations.
Next, the new influential condition was established and when a new equilibrium was
reached they measured the balancing force judged to be equivalent (but opposite
in sign) to the newly introduced force. Thus, forces are introduced as members
of an equivalence class rather than by a direct application of the definition, i.e.,
no acceleration is truly measured in a first instance. Such were the methods of
Coulomb and Ampère for example.
6. On Newton’s laws of Classical Mechanics
Those, like us, that have tried to reach a deeper understanding of Newton’s
ideas by reading the Principia, might have come to the conclusion that Newton left
behind little or no clues on the fundamentals behind his axioms. In the Scholium to
the Definitions Newton (1687), Newton writes his famous notion of absolute space
and time. Although he recognises them as related to the common intuition of “the
vulgar” he proposes that the vulgar conceptions are imperfect images of absolute
time and absolute space, a position that reminds us of the precedence of Platonic
worlds, being the world of ideas the real world Plato (2014 –). Needless to say,
Newton relies on the vulgar notions to deliver and argument for his notions of space
and time, place and motion. He indeed introduces without explicit recognition the
idea of Galilean transformations: “Thus in a ship under sail, the relative place of a
body is that part of the ship which the body possesses, [...] But real, absolute rest,
is the continuance of the body in the same part of that immovable space in which
the ship itself, its cavity, and all that it contains is moved. Wherefore if the earth is
really at rest, the body which relatively rests in the ship, will really and absolutely
move and with the same velocity which the ship has on the earth. But if the earth
also moves the truly and absolute motion of the body will arise, partly from the
true motion of the earth in immovable space; partly from the relative motion of
the ship on the earth; and if the body moves also relatively in the ship; its true
motion will arise, partly from the true motion of the earth in immovable space, and
partly from the relative motions as well of the ship on the earth, as of the body on
the ship;...” ((Motte) Newton, 1687, p. 78) For Newton, it is relative space what
can be conceived by the vulgar as fixed to the heavens: “All things are placed in
time as to order of succession; and in space as to order of situation. It is from
their essence or nature that they are places; and that the primary place of things
should be movable, is absurd [...] But because the parts of space cannot be seen,
or distinguished from one another by our senses, therefore in their stead we use
sensible measures of them. For from the positions and distances of things from any
body considered as immovable, we define all places; and then with respect to such
places we estimate all motions... And so, instead of absolute places and motions
we use relative ones, and that without any inconvenience in common affairs; but in
philosophical disquisitions, we ought to abstract from our senses and consider things
themselves, distinct from what are only sensible measures of them. For it may be
that there is no body at rest to which the places and motions of others may be
referred ((Motte) Newton, 1687, p. 79) (Cajori corrected the last phrase to: “And
therefore, as it is possible, that in the remote region of fixed stars, and perhaps
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far beyond them, there may be some body absolutely at rest...” ((Mote-Cajori)
Newton, 1687)).
Newton’s construction cannot come to an end unless the existence of an end,
absolute space, is introduced ad-hoc. In terms of the present work, Newton’s con-
struction is moving from the subjectivity of one reference into the subjectivity of
another, each one carrying its relative space. The sequence of subjective views can
only finish in an objective view. Is God the observer of absolute space? Thus,
rather than fixed to the heavens, absolute space is fixed to the Heavens, i.e., ob-
jective space would be God’s perspective. The same sort of recursion is present in
absolute time (see General Scholium, Newton (1687, p. 503–)).
Concerning time, Newton did not conceive a method of measuring absolute time,
but only approximations to the ideal time: “Absolute time, in astronomy, is dis-
tinguished from relative, by the equation or correction of the vulgar time. For the
natural days are truly unequal, though they are commonly considered as equal,
and used for a measure of time; astronomers correct this inequality for their more
accurate deducing of the celestial motions. It may be, that there is no such thing
as an equable motion, whereby time may be accurately measured. All motions may
be accelerated and retarded; but the true, or equable, progress of absolute time is
liable to no change.“ ((Motte) Newton, 1687, p. 78)
Newton conceived absolute space and time as the limit of a process in which
relative motions were added and clocks were perfected in their regularity. The
opposite view of space in those years was that of Leibniz who sustained the relational
view. We have shown in this work that both views are intimately related and that
absolute space and time consist in a final attempt to maintain the observer in the
scene. In our discussion, in contrast, subjective space and motion are the result of
the introduction of the idealised observer in the scene. Newton’s view of absolute
time and space corresponds to the egocentric stage of the child, as observed by
Piaget (Piaget, 1999, p. 367), later to be modified by the recognition of the other.
It is important to notice that although relative space appears as objective, relative
time appears only as intersubjective, being impossible for us to define an objective
measure of time without an ad-hoc assumption, which in all cases amounts to
construct a physical equivalent of our memory such as logging the tics of a clock or
the oscillations of a pendulum.
In Principia Mathematica Newton founded the concept of mass on the intuition
of weight: “The quantity of matter is the measure of the same, arising from its dens-
ity and bulk conjointly [...] It is this quantity that I mean hereafter everywhere
under the name of body or mass. And the same is known by the weight of each
body; for it is proportional to the weight, as I have found by experiments on pen-
dulums, very accurately made, which shall be shown hereafter.” ((Motte) Newton,
1687) Such an idea was later challenged in an a-posteriori empiricist view by Mach
Mach (1919). We have shown in this work that Newton’s perspective is proper to
the construction of knowledge, this is, the genetic meaning of mass emerges from
interactions. We realise that the gravitational interaction is the most notorious
one, and pre-exists the concept of force. In the terms of Popper, Newton’s theory
is simpler than Mach’s proposal, since it lends itself more generously to refutation
Popper (1959).
It is worth noting that Principia Mathematica dedicates special attention to
the issue of relative vs. absolute rotations. A fundamental difference between
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rotational and translational motion is that rotations cannot be conceived without
acceleration. In the Scholium to the first chapter Newton discusses centripetal
forces: “A centripetal force is that by which bodies are drawn or impelled, or in
any way tend, towards a point as to a centre. Of this sort is gravity” ((Motte)
Newton, 1687, p. 74) and he continues later “The effects which distinguish absolute
from relative motion are, the forces of receding from the axis of circular motion.
For there are no such forces in a circular motion purely relative, but in a true
and absolute circular motion, they are greater or less, according to the quantity of
the motion.” ((Motte) Newton, 1687, p. 80-81) This view contrasts with Mach’s
attempts to wipe out the difference between relative and absolute rotations: “The
principles of mechanics can, indeed, be so conceived, that even for relative rotations
centrifugal forces arise.” Mach (1919, (II.VI.5, p. 232)). In that paragraph Mach
remains within the kinematic aspect of relative rotations; what we may call the
visual intuition of rotation. However, in the construction of knowledge, the child
gradually adds other sensations to the visual, noticeably the physical effort required
to sustain a rotation. The distinction relates to our experiences as children, with
relative motion related to spinning around our vertical axis (while standing up)
and absolute circular motion such as the one used to throw stones with a sling.
While the visual appearance is equivalent, the complete sensorial experience is quite
different. The sensorial difference has to be accounted for and Newton introduces
the distinction between absolute and relative rotation. Mach makes an enormous
metaphysical effort -thus betraying his own ideas- to disregard the difference in
sensory effects arising in actual rotations as opposed to apparent ones (called in
this context “relative” both by Newton and Mach). Poincaré Poincaré (1913, (Ch.
VII)) criticised Mach’s view accurately indicating that in order to confuse apparent
rotations with true ones, we need to assign to the apparent rotation a force which is
contrary to intuition (it increases with distance), a sort of conspiracy of the rest of
the universe to deceive the observer. Mach’s attempt to suppress the subject comes
short of Newton’s insight about the difference between subjective and objective
descriptions.
Poincaré (Poincaré, 1913) insisted on this matter proposing for discussion an
“Earth” always covered (clouded), so that celestial references could not be observed.
The scientists of this “Earth” would discuss relative and absolute rotations. “In the
theory of relative motion we observe, besides real forces, two imaginary forces,
which we call ordinary centrifugal force and compounded centrifugal force. Our
imaginary scientists can thus explain everything by looking upon these two forces
as real, and they would not see in this a contradiction of the generalised principle
of inertia, for these forces would depend, the one on the relative positions of the
different parts of the system, such as real attractions, and the other on their relative
velocities, as in the case of real frictions. Many difficulties, however, would before
long awaken their attention. If they succeeded in realising an isolated system, the
centre of gravity of this system would not have an approximately rectilinear path.
They could invoke, to explain this fact, the centrifugal forces which they would
regard as real, and which, no doubt, they would attribute to the mutual actions of
the bodies—only they would not see these forces vanish at great distances— that
is to say, in proportion as the isolation is better realised. Far from it. Centrifugal
force increases indefinitely with distance. Already this difficulty would seem to
them sufficiently serious, but it would not detain them for long. They would soon
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imagine some very subtle medium analogous to our ether, in which all bodies would
be bathed, and which would exercise on them a repulsive action. But that is not all.
Space is symmetrical—yet the laws of motion would present no symmetry. They
should be able to distinguish between right and left. They would see, for instance,
that cyclones always turn in the same direction, while for reasons of symmetry they
should turn indifferently in any direction. If our scientists were able by dint of much
hard work to make their universe perfectly symmetrical, this symmetry would not
subsist, although there is no apparent reason why it should be disturbed in one
direction more than in another. They would extract this from the situation no
doubt they would invent something which would not be more extraordinary than
the glass spheres of Ptolemy...” The discussion continues for long, mathematising
this “Earth” until reaching a contradiction.
In terms of genetic epistemology a central place is taken by cognitive surpass9
shortly said, it consists in a reordering of previous knowledge, extending it into
more general (universal) forms. The old knowledge, however, is not suppressed.
It becomes rather a particular form of the new one, a form that supports as well
the new structure of knowledge. Thus, the distinction about rotating around our
axis and that of revolving a stone with a sling must be preserved. As indicated
by Poincaré, Mach’s posit destroys this difference. Still, the difference does not
imply absolute space, because the latter means to conceive rotations with respect
to something else, while for an extended body like the Earth rotations correspond
to the movement of one part of the Earth around another. Hence, it is possible and
simple to forget about the stars still preserving the eidetic seeing that originated the
distinction. In the relationalist point of view, it can be said as well that the stone
revolves around us, or both revolve around the common centre of mass, but in all
cases, sensible forces are exerted between the revolving bodies, the bodies interact.
The same can be said with respect to (parts of) the Earth, but the heavens have
nothing to do with it.
6.1. The present view. In this essay we explore the consequences of recognising
our humanity, the acceptance of the undeniable fact that our thoughts have their
grounds in the constructions we produced as babies and infants, later integrated
with our cultural background. This structure is built always under the supervi-
sion of reason, since reason protects the unity of our conception of the world: the
construction by dialectical oppositions that we have come to call understanding.
Thus, the starting point of our construction is a principle of knowledge, an internal
requirement of both what we are ready to accept as knowledge of the world and
what has to be rejected as such. We named this principle the No Arbitrariness
Principle (NAP). On the positive side, it enables us to pursue the quest of de-
veloping an objective knowledge of the world. Since knowledge means to put the
input of the sensory system in correspondence with the organisational labour of
our brain10, truly objective knowledge can only be sought by a second motion in
9Original in Spanish: rebasamiento cognoscitivo (Piaget and García, 1989).
10This point of view has several precedents. Kant, Kant (1787, Introduction) opens the book
by saying “That all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt. For how is it
possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened into exercise otherwise than by means
of objects which affect our senses, and partly of themselves produce representations, partly rouse
our powers of understanding into activity, to compare to connect, or to separate these, and so to
convert the raw material of our sensuous impressions into a knowledge of objects, which is called
experience?” and later “Understanding cannot intuite, and the sensuous faculty cannot think. In
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which the subject (the observer) removes her/himself from the scene. This is the
master plan of this work, attaining as much objectivity as possible by going across
(transcending) subjectivity.
If space and time have their foundation in the early experiences of life, interac-
tions are a rather different matter. Interactions are not objects in space. Forces
are metaphysical entities responsible for the departure from inertial motion, they
have no time since causes are only made apparent by their effects: the gravitational
interaction is present before, during and after the fall of an object. Forces can only
be recognised by their effects and characterised using the established framework in
a process of inference. The first law of motion has then a stronger support that the
other two; the result is independent of the way we characterise interactions. The
second law and even more the third are in a good degree the result of promissory
assumptions. Newton, in search of credibility for the principle of action and reac-
tion, relies on contact forces that impress us in a sensory form (“If you press a stone
with your finger, the finger is also pressed by the stone” ((Motte) Newton, 1687)).
In our discussion we explore to what extent the principle of action and reaction is
a result of NAP, restricting our discussion to forces of instantaneous action. The
result is a generalised principle of action and reaction. Thus, Newton’s third law
has a weaker logical support than the first and second laws. If classical forces are
ever found that break reflection symmetry, we expect total linear momentum not
to be conserved by the interaction.
Apart from assumptions of technical character and others suggested by observa-
tion, the present approach rests on a principle of knowledge (derived from NAP),
namely that the relative properties of a pair of interacting objects depend only
on the objects themselves and their interaction. Thus, we develop the concept of
objective relative distance. Indeed, the construction rests on the resolution of the
tension between objective and subjective. In this sense, we get past the traditional
issue present in Leibniz, Newton and later Mach and Poincaré (see below) about
“absolute” and “relative” distances. The quest here is to objectivise relative dis-
tances. The present work disposes of absolute space, while retaining objectivity.
Another basic underlying idea is that the concepts of space and time are different.
Space is related to permanence and time to change. In particular, space and time
are not interchangeable. This is based in the way we construct our knowledge.
7. On the laws of Nature
In a society that rests on religious concepts it makes sense to consider that Nature
is a creation of God and that She/He endowed Nature with laws. As religious beliefs
decline and faith in our own strength grows, we come to accept that the laws of
no other way than from the united operation of both, can knowledge arise”. Husserl formulates
similar ideas as “Isolated experience, even when it is accumulated, is still worth little to it. It is
in the methodical disposition and connection of experiences, in the interplay of experience and
thought, which has its logically rigid laws, that valid experience is distinguished from invalid,
that each experience is accorded its level of validity, and that objectively valid knowledge as such,
knowledge of nature, is worked out.” Husserl and Lauer (1956, p. 234) Piaget and Garcia state
“Not only is there an absence of a clear frontier between the contributions of the subject and those
of the object (since we can only know about interactions between the two) but in addition, it is
only to the extent that logical and mathematical structures are applied that one can come to attain
the object, and objectivity improves as a function of richer logico-mathematical structures. In
fact, the elementary perceptual object is already partially ’logicized’ from the start, even though
much less ’objective’ than the more elaborated object.” Piaget and García (1989, Introduction)
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Nature are actually laws produced by humanity to understand Nature, they are laws
for the understanding of Nature, constructs generated to organise the sensory world,
the continuation at the level of civilisation of the work autonomously initiated by
every child. As such, the laws of Nature are subject to a higher set of rules, those
discovered by every member of our species in our early quest for survival. They
include the conviction that “there is something out there” that reaches us through
our senses (call it Nature) and therefore, the possibility of objective knowledge.
Unlike social rules, on which we agree in order to preserve energies for other relev-
ant social matters and are established by consensus or power, unlike the “agreement
on disagreeing” that makes room for cooperation by setting aside disputes, Truth
is the only form of agreement with Nature, as Nature is not a social actor that can
change behaviour or negotiate the rules. But Truth requires an agreement with
our humanity as well. Thus, the laws of Nature or truth about Nature come as a
result of the dialectic interplay between a universal (humanwise - or civilisation-
wise) subject and the universe of sensory observations, Nature. None of them can
be absent in the laws of Nature. In turn, the universal subject requires a corres-
pondence between the individuals, it requires intersubjectivity. Intersubjectivity
sets the lower level of requisites on the side of the subject for calling something a
law of Nature.
Much of our understanding of Nature comes from what we call “dialectical open-
ings to knowledge”. Thus, the recognition of ourselves requires the simultaneous
recognition of not-ourselves, our environment. Likewise, the motion of isolated
bodies, the inertial motion, has its necessary opponent in the motion of bodies that
interact. At first sight, we could have introduced just unilateral action since the
opponent of isolated is not-isolated, i.e., influenced by (or influencing) others. But
such an idea contradicts the higher level of reasoning, the rules on rules, one of
them being the No Arbitrariness Principle (NAP). Do we have a reason to sup-
port that one body can influence another without being influenced, that there is
an asymmetry among bodies? So far, the answer is no.
The present approach is not just discursive, it is constructive as well. Let us see
how it works on a much debated matter.
7.1. The speed of light. During a large part of the XIX-th century and well into
the following century, a number of attempts to measure the speed of light and to
understand its constancy were done. These attempts were mostly independent of
the electromagnetic theory of light (at most, the wave-like properties of light were
used). Experiments such as those by Fizeau in 1848, later developed and improved
by Cornu in 1872-74 Cornu (1876) (using a light source/detector, a rotating cog-
wheel and a mirror at rest relative to the source/detector) consider that there exists
a light path and that the event “detect the light” occurs at a later time than the
event “turn on the light”. The measuring issue can hence be regarded as purely
kinematical, although the connection between light and electrodynamics was ad-
vanced already in the mid 1800’s. The final outcome of these efforts has been that
the “speed of light” is constant and also that this constancy is incompatible with
Newtonian mechanics. In this Section we will show that under the present approach
based on NAP the last assertion is incorrect.
7.1.1. The view of this work. In the first place, we must raise the objection that
light, being a perception resulting from the electromagnetic interaction, is not an
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object. Hence, what is meant by “the speed of light” needs to be explained. What is
truly measured in Fizeau’s or Cornu’s experiments is a distance and a time-interval.
The quotient of both has the dimensions of a velocity so we may agree to consider it
a velocity. A view compatible with NAP, is to consider that all three events related
to the measurements (emission, reflection and detection) are actually the result of
a common cause, namely, the electromagnetic interaction.
Whatever we make in our interpretation of light, it is undeniable that what we
have called the speed of light is the quotient between an objective distance and an
intersubjective time interval. The result is objective (or rather intersubjective) and
it is subject to the laws of transformations of objective quantities, this is, it is the
same for all observers.
7.1.2. The (traditional) mediator view. The main step in the traditional conception
of light is to interpret the measured quotient in terms of the velocity of a body or
a material wave, something that has a place in space. Since interactions are not
matter, in principle this interpretation introduces a fundamental belief: interac-
tions are mediated by substantial entities that as such have a place in space. As
far as we know, neither this assumption nor its rational/philosophical basis is ever
stated. Interactions do not have a place, interactions require two places and rel-
ative distances, such as the relative distance between source/detector and mirror.
If we want to associate the events emission, reflection and detection in terms of
traditional causal relations it will have to be in the order: turn on the light, reflect
the light at the mirror, detect the light. The cause (in the modern sense discussed
at the Introduction) of our detection of light cannot have ceased by the time of
the detection. Since without turning on the light there is no light to be detected,
and the same can be said when the mirror is not in place, both the presence of the
mirror and the turning on of the light are within the determinants of the detec-
ted light. However, the observed events are not the causes in themselves since the
first event might very well have ceased when the third event happens. Similarly,
the detected light immediately associated with the turn-on event could only be a
cause if it travelled (matter-like) in space. The interpretation in terms of a material
analogous allows for questions that do not correspond to what it is truly measured.
Equating a subjective quantity such as |vaL| (the velocity of an interpreted ma-
terial point L with respect to a reference a) with an objective quantity such as C
(namely a constant, and hence objective and invariant) is, to say the least, con-
fusing. A possible construction could be to consider ∆t as subjective, since after
all, absolute time was an assumption of Newtonian mechanics. If space is still to
be conceived as absolute, then time might very well depend on the velocity of the
reference system with respect to absolute space.
Let us work out an exercise along this line of thought. We will tentatively assume
as a new axiom a deeply rooted belief that we are not going to offer for examination:
Tacit belief 1. Interactions are mediated by substantial entities that as such have
a place in space and a velocity.
Then, if the substantial entity moves in absolute space with a characteristic
velocity, we would expect that it appears to us with different (and measurable)
relative velocities depending on the relative motion of our system of references
with respect to absolute space. However, experiments (interpreted in this frame of
mind) indicate otherwise: we measure always the same velocity. Therefore, absolute
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time, absolute space, these measurements and the present tacit belief have come
into collision. We can ask ourselves what can we save from the wreckage? For
the sake of the exercise, we insist in keeping the tacit belief alive. It has been
argued that such a state of things is incompatible with Newtonian mechanics, but
again, this is not the case. Is it possible that velocities transform between different
reference systems satisfying the existence of a universal velocity and the structure
of Newtonian mechanics? The following Theorems give an affirmative solution.
Definition 9. Let U ∈
{
z ∈ R3 : |z| < C
}
, with |U | its Euclidean norm. Further,
let g(U) = G(|U |), where G is a strictly increasing continuous function such that
G(0) = 1 and lima→C− G(a) = ∞. We advance that U will play the role of a
velocity in the sequel. Then, for |U |, |V | < C we define velocity addition U ⊕ V as
U ⊕ V =W ⇔ g(W )W = g(U)U + g(V )V,
where addition in the rhs denotes standard vector addition in 3-space.
Theorem 2. (Nonlinear presentation of Galileo’s group) Velocity addition has the
following properties:
a) |U |, |V | < C ⇒ |W | < C.
b) U ⊕ 0 = U , i.e., 0 is the neutral element of velocity addition.
c) U ⊕ V = V ⊕ U .
d) For all U , the inverse of U is −U , i.e., U ⊕ (−U) = 0.
e) Associativity: (W ⊕ V )⊕ U =W ⊕ (V ⊕ U).
Proof. For most statements it is a matter of doing the algebra. For statement a),
the function g(V )|V | is a bijection of the interval [0, C) onto the nonnegative reals.
|U |, |V | < C ⇒ g(U)U+g(V )V <∞, hence there is a unique |W | in [0, C) such that
g(W )W = g(U)U + g(V )V . Statements b), c) and d) follow from the definition.
Regarding statement e), let A = W ⊕ V and B = V ⊕ U . Applying the definition
two times we have: A⊕U = g(A)A+g(U)U = g(W )W+g(V )V +g(U)U . Similarly,
W ⊕B = g(W )W + g(B)B = g(W )W + g(V )V + g(U)U . 
In this exercise we consider relative position and velocity as primary concepts. The
addition of time intervals has to be deduced from the concepts of relative position
and velocity.
Definition 10. We call velocity V (with |V | < C ) the vector satisfying∆x = V∆t.
For any reference system, we call t subjective time, while T = t
g(V ) is called proper
time.
The following Theorem indicates that while this way of thinking rests on a sub-
jective time, there exists an underlying intersubjective time as long as space is
objective.
Theorem 3. Let O move with velocity V1with respect to S and velocity V2 relative to
the observer S′, while S′ moves with velocity V3 relative to S, such that V1 = V2⊕V3
. Let
∆x = V1∆t1
∆x′ = V2∆t2
∆SS′ = V3∆t3 = −∆S′S
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and ∆Ti =
∆ti
g(Vi)
for i = 1, 2, 3. Then the proper time is invariant, ∆T1 = ∆T2 =
∆T3, if and only if distances in space are invariant.
Proof. The distance between S and O can be determined both by S and by S′.
Invariance of distances is expressed as
dSO = ∆x = ∆x
′ +∆SS′ = d
′
SO
or, equivalently,
V1 = V2
∆t2
∆t1
+ V3
∆t3
∆t1
= V2
g(V2)
g(V1)
+ V3
g(V3)
g(V1)
.
The last equality follows from the law of addition of velocities. Invariance of distance
holds for all velocities U, V,W satisfying V = U ⊕W , if and only if
∆t2
g(V2)
=
∆t1
g(V1)
∆t3
g(V3)
=
∆t1
g(V1)
.
It follows that ∆T1 = ∆T2 = ∆T3. The reverse implication follows by assuming
∆T1 = ∆T2 = ∆T3 and applying the previous reasoning in reverse order to obtain
dSO = d
′
SO. 
∆T can be interpreted as the time measured by an observer moving with the
object, since in such a case we have g(0) = 1 and ∆T = ∆t.
As far as we know, the physics emerging from this picture has not been studied.
Certainly, we may imagine other alternatives to exit the contradictory situation.
For instance, we could drop entirely Tacit belief 1, as in the view of this work, or
try other forms of reconciliation such as e.g., keeping Tacit belief 1 while dropping
both absolute space and time, as well as relative distance. This part of the story is
well known.
We have shown that the argued need to abandon the Newtonian frame upon the
requirement of a constant speed of light is not mandatory. On the contrary, this
course of action is related to a bolder decision: to associate interactions with the
exchange of substantial entities (i.e., to consider light an object) and subsequently
opting for a solution without all three of absolute space, absolute time and invariant
relative distance.
7.2. Poincaré’s principle of relativity and related principles. As we have
already mentioned, the No Arbitrariness Principle relates to Leibniz’ principle of
sufficient reason. Mach also used the principle of sufficient reason in the form of
a “principle of symmetry” (Mach, 1919, p. 9). At the beginning of the XX-th
century, a related principle became notorious, the principle of relativity presented
by Poincaré (1913, p. 107). “The motion of any system must obey the same laws,
whether it be referred to fixed axes or to moving axes carrying along a rectilinear
uniform motion. This is the principle of relative motion that forces upon us for two
reasons: first, the commonest experiences confirm it, and second, the contrary hy-
pothesis is singularly repugnant to the mind”. Poincaré hints us about the principle
being a principle of knowledge (“not solely the result of experiment”), but does not
elaborate further. As we have shown, Poincaré’s principle belongs to the context
of interactions, for in the description of interactions it should not matter which
isolated body we take (arbitrarily) as reference for our calculations. This issue was
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advanced before in this work. Poincaré and Mach inherit the discussion between
absolute and relative spaces already present in Leibniz-Clarke and Newton. They
attempt to resolve this issue in different ways, most remarkably Mach reducing the
cosmos to a set of empirical relations without subjects (observers). The present ap-
proach goes past this controversy by introducing the arbitrariness of the observer
(and with her/him the concept of space) and subsequently eliminating the arbit-
rariness by focusing the understanding on objective or intersubjective elements. In
short, this work takes sides for an objective and relative description of interactions,
with the stress resting on its objective nature.
8. Summary and conclusions
We have reconstructed Newtonian mechanics starting with a minimal realism
Lombardi and Pérez Ransanz (2012) that accepts as starting point the existence
of a real, or objective, world. The analysis of this physical world, we called it
Nature, proceeds through several constructive steps. Some of them consist in dia-
lectical openings to understanding. The first opening is the opposition between
objective and subjective: objective opposes not-objective, i.e., subjective, which is
what comes from the knowing subject. Understanding Nature is the result of a
dialectic interplay –or dialogue– between the knowing subject and the object being
known. It is worth mentioning that the subject is not an individual in principle but
rather humanity or society. Knowledge in this primary form cannot be objective,
the subject needs to transcend (negate) her/his subjectivity if she/he is going to
reach any possible objectivity. Hence, the subject establishes principles of reason
such as the principle of sufficient reason, which we have recast in mathematical
terms under the name of No Arbitrariness Principle. Actually, it is not the subject
by her/himself who establishes the principle but the subject in relation to Nature.
There is no form in which the dialectic objective-subjective can be separated giving
pre-eminence to one of the terms.
NAP recognises the role of symmetry groups as a basic tool for understanding.
Symmetries contribute with more than just aesthetic appealing Wigner (1964); they
express the permanence of the laws of Nature beyond the arbitrariness of the know-
ing subject. Moreover, NAP –or in a broader sense the principle of sufficient reason–
might have represented an adaptive advantage for the early humanity, allowing to
elaborate consequences of our relation with Nature.
NAP appears, at first sight, related to Kant’s first formulation of the categorical
imperative “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time,
will that it should become a universal law” Kant (1993, (4:421)). The requisite
of universal application is precisely the action of removing all arbitrariness that
may arise in the application of the maxim to different rational agents. A moral
action must be free of arbitrariness. The associated set of arbitrariness usually
considered is that of the agents subjected to the law. In more common terms, we
can say: no rational justice exists if the laws do not pass the test of being equal
for all citizens. We believe that NAP is a fundamental principle of rationality that
emerges in different forms for different contexts.
Important contributions to mechanics come from the early childhood where the
notions of time and space are formed as a consequence of the active adaptation of
the child to her/his environment. In this stage of our construction, concepts point
toward perceptions rather than to other concepts. With the opening produced
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by the concepts of isolated and interacting comes the first mechanical law, the
only law acceptable to NAP for the condition of permanence of isolated objects.
Repeated use of NAP in different contexts will finally unravel Newton’s laws. But
these laws require an increasing number of assumptions regarding Nature. Indeed,
Newton’s mechanics arises as the interplay of reason, idealisation and experience
in our relation to Nature.
We address the laws of Nature not as rules proper to the objects, as in meta-
physical realism (Lombardi and Pérez Ransanz, 2012), but rather as laws for the
understanding of Nature generated by the interplay between subject and object.
This position becomes quite evident when Galilean transformations of velocities
are not alleged to be experimental laws but rather considered as a requisite for the
suppression of contributions arbitrarily introduced by the observer.
The adopted approach allows us to attain a higher level of consciousness on
the strength of the different components that contribute to the construction of
mechanics. There is a precedence between these components which can be better
appreciated by considering the consequences of removing them: (a) the consequence
of renouncing to logic and to the laws of understanding is not being able to under-
stand the world, (b) renouncing to the early elaborations of primary concepts such
as time and space leads to a dissociation between everyday life and physics, the
latter becoming entirely pragmatic and justified a-posteriori (because it is conveni-
ent), (c) in contrast, modifying our temporary beliefs has no real cost other than
the effort of reconstructing our understanding on a more solid basis. Moreover, the
present approach allows for a critical view of further developments, since it opens
for new alternatives to the current views in different issues, alternatives that we
believe should be explored to decide their worth.
An important reflection corresponds to the use of tacit beliefs (also known, in
mathematics, as hidden assumptions or hidden lemmas). Inasmuch as they are
hidden and as such can escape the scrutiny of reason, they must be considered
dangerous Lissack (2017). They elude the principle of necessary reason and usually
protect something that is not explicitly mentioned. In the case of Tacit belief 1,
it hides the fact that we support the argument in a material model, be it wave
or particle, on the basis that we cannot imagine it otherwise. Our imagination
works with memories of the sensible world and in doing so it limits its value to the
material experience. “Because we are not able to imagine otherwise” appears to us
as an extremely weak argument: the confession of a limitation does not constitute
a reason. We can explore the possibilities of the hidden assumption but we should
be ready to abandon it if it comes into conflict with higher principles.
Scientific disciplines are not autonomous, they are ruled by reason, which is the
only autonomous entity. The application of the principles of reason to understand-
ing is known as critic. Critic in science needs not only be declared but it should
be truly exercised. This work is indeed an exercise of critic. It seems proper to
quote Kant (Kant, 1787, The discipline of reason) on this respect “... where reason
is not held in a plain track by the influence of empirical or of pure intuition, that is,
when it is employed in the transcendental sphere of pure conceptions, it stands in
great need of discipline, to restrain its propensity to overstep the limits of possible
experience and to keep it from wandering into error. In fact, the utility of the
philosophy of pure reason is entirely of this negative character.” The terms pure
intuition and pure conceptions in Kant may be understood from: “Pure intuition
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consequently contains merely the form under which something is intuited, and pure
conception only the form of the thought of an object. Only pure intuitions and pure
conceptions are possible a priori; the empirical only a posteriori.” (Kant, 1787, p.
75)
In conclusion, the construction of knowledge is not only a philosophical perspect-
ive but it is a constructive and critic method as well. Indeed, the history of know-
ledge has to recognise the contributions frommetaphysical (unverifiable/irrefutable)
ideas such as absolute space and later the reification of interactions. Changing the
underlying metaphysics, great revolutions operate in physics, which is not automat-
ically equal to great progresses. In these lines, recognising the need for introducing
somemetaphysics, the idea of a pluralist realism Chang (2012); Lombardi and Pérez Ransanz
(2012) should be considered not only as a description but rather as a programme.
We might ask if the efforts of critical revision such as those of Mach or the present
work could have been possible without the preceding developments and their meta-
physical ingredients. Critic, as the negative tool of philosophy, cannot operate in the
void but can operate as self-criticism in the process of construction of knowledge.
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